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Abstract What is psychiatry? Such a question is increasingly important to engage
with in light of the development of new diagnostic frameworks that have wide-ranging
and international clinical and societal implications. I suggest in this reflective essay
that ‘psychiatry’ is not a singular entity that enjoins consistent forms of critique along
familiar axes; rather, it is a heterogeneous assemblage of interacting material and sym-
bolic elements (some of which endure, and some of which are subject to innovation). In
underscoring the diversity of psychiatry, I seek to move towards further sociological
purchase on what remains a contested and influential set of discourses and practices.
This approach foregrounds the relationships between scientific knowledge, biomedical
institutions, social action and subjective experience; these articulations co-produce both
psychiatry and each other. One corollary of this emphasis on multiplicity and incoherence
within psychiatric theory, research and practice, is that critiques which elide this com-
plexity are rendered problematic. Engagements with psychiatry are, I argue, best furthered
by recognising its multifaceted nature.
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Introduction
The logics of psychiatry are powerfully constitutive of normality and pathology.
It is unsurprising, therefore, that this profession has long been an object of study
for sociologists (Goldstein, 1979; Pilgrim and Rogers, 1994). Today, one of the most
important means by which psychiatric power operates is through the American
Psychiatric Association (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders (DSM). Summarising and defining every disorder recognised by the APA,
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this text is the leading diagnostic text operating within ‘Western’ mental health.
It has profound effects on the understandings clinicians, patients, policymakers,
scientists and wider publics have on health and illness, and its contents circulate
far beyond the clinic. In May 2013, the APA are due to release the next (fifth)
edition of their manual. The ‘DSM-5’ is both highly anticipated and its expected
contents hotly contested – not least because many of the changes from the current
edition are thought to ‘imply a more inclusive system of diagnoses where the pool
of “normality” shrinks to a mere puddle’ (Wykes and Callard, 2010: p. 302).
As Pilgrim and Rogers (2005) have discussed, relationships between psy-
chiatry and the social sciences, particularly sociology, can be hostile – though
certainly not always, and examples abound of successful collaboration (perhaps
especially in psychiatric epidemiology). Today, it is not uncommon for socio-
logical work on psychiatry to maintain a critical position; such analyses draw
on a tradition of critique that has highlighted, for instance, the tendency
of psychiatric institutions to marginalise or further stigmatise already dis-
empowered groups and individuals, and to lack sensitivity to the ways in which
structural inequalities play a role in the social production of psychopathology
itself (Busfield, 1989; Brown, 2003).
In this essay, I review some of the critical sociological discourse on psy-
chiatry, aiming to further nuance this through a variety of (counter-)examples
from the social scientific literature. In particular, I draw on first, social scientific
scholarship that takes as its focus the use of diagnostic texts; second, the degree
to which psychiatrists medicalise individuals and society; and third, the
recourse to (neuro)biology within psychiatric theory, research and practice.
While recognising the great academic and political significance of earlier
studies, this article aims to suggest that psychiatry is not a singular entity but a
form of complex socio-technical praxis. The profession can be regarded as a
heterogeneous assemblage of interacting material and symbolic elements
(from hospital buildings, to diagnostic handbooks; from debates around
medicalisation, to demands for increased access to therapy; from professional
training, to clinical ethics; from drugs, to psychoanalysis); considering it from
this perspective perhaps challenges us to find new modes of engagement.
Conceptual backdrop
This essay is underpinned by theoretical and empirical work from science and
technology studies pertaining to the reciprocal constitution of facts, artefacts
and meanings (Latour, 1987; Harraway, 1991; Pickering, 1995; Jasanoff, 2004).
Such work seeks to understand the dynamics between these domains in the
production and stabilisation of science and society. Here, I seek to sketch, in
broad strokes, some of the relationships that exist between (and are mutually
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supportive of ) clinical knowledge, research and practice and the social contexts
within which these are situated (and help to produce).
In particular, I am influenced by scholarship on the co-production of socio-
technical realities. Co-productionist work refuses both the (techno)scientific and
social reductionism that have, on occasion, been evident in earlier scholarly
analyses of scientific knowledge; instead, it emphasises the great degree to which
‘science’ and ‘society’ mutually constitute and legitimate one another. The idiom
of co-production thus provides a valuable means by which analysts can articulate
the dynamic constitution of knowledge and social order (Jasanoff, 2004; St. Clair,
2006; Tuinstra et al, 2006; Brodwin, 2008; Pickersgill, forthcoming).
For STS scholar Sheila Jasanoff (2004), co-productionist research can be
delineated into two strands: interactionist co-production and constitutive
co-production. The former takes the epistemological work of the Edinburgh
school of the sociology of scientific knowledge as its starting point. Here,
domains such as science and politics are considered to interact with one
another, such that solutions to the problems of knowledge become aligned with
solutions to problems of social order (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985). On the other
hand, accounts of constitutive co-production draw more overtly on the empirical
and theoretical writings of Bruno Latour – his actor-network theory in particular –
and are focused on the production of socio-technical systems. It is this vein of
co-productionist work that my own essay resonates with most clearly.
Before I continue some caveats must be outlined. This review is necessarily
selective and partial, representing my own view as a UK scholar of some of the
key themes that run through the literature, conference debate and activism in
this area. Others may therefore disagree with both the scope of the content of
the essay, and my interpretations of the studies cited. Yet, the overriding aim
of this article is to (re)ignite debate and engagement with psychiatry at a time of
potentially great change; thus, if readers disagree with how the issues mapped
herein are framed and discussed then that is, in many ways, precisely the point.
Standardising Subjectivity
Classificatory systems and standards play a key role within contemporary
biomedicine, structuring and legitimating a multiplicity of theories, discourses
and practices (Timmermans and Berg, 2003). Within psychiatry, there are two
key standards: the International Classification of Diseases, published by the
World Health Organisation, and the DSM. A prominent and powerful tool for
the standardisation of psychopathology, the importance of the DSM ‘cannot
be overstated’ (Aho, 2008, p. 245). Its use and influence extends around the
globe (Lee, 1999; Orr, 2006; Lloyd, 2008), and can act to profoundly structure
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professional work and its theoretical underpinnings even within socio-technical
spaces that are very different from those in which the text was developed.
Through its ability to standardise psychopathology, the DSM functions ‘as
a connective tissue’ for the different groups of actors that have a stake in
psychiatry (Lakoff, 2005, p. 13); it has ‘made mental illness transferable
between the domains of industry, government, and biomedicine’ (ibid., p. 35).
At once a diagnostic guide for clinicians, a methodological tool for psychiatric
researchers, a mediator of insurance claims and a focal point for policy, the
DSM is a polyvalent text used internationally by a multiplicity of actors. These
uses go far beyond the standardisation of the immediate clinical encounter and
help to create shifts in the cultures of psychiatry itself.
The DSM has attracted critics from a number of sources. Stuart A. Kirk and
Herb Kutchins (Kirk and Kutchins, 1992; Kutchins and Kirk, 1997), for instance,
have documented the various kinds of politics and professional tensions that
contoured the contents of the seminal third edition of the DSM (DSM-III, pub-
lished in 1980); they have also deconstructed the scientific claims upon which
much of the text’s legitimacy came to rest. Kirk and Kutchins were critical of
numerous aspects of US psychiatry, including the close alignment between the
insurance industry and the APA, and the emphasis on the APA on the ‘relia-
bility’ of DSM disorders as opposed to their ‘validity’.1 Such work usefully
highlights some of the complex dynamics between psychiatry, science and
society. Yet, we must nevertheless ask how the terms featured within the text
actually translate into clinical practice; after all, as sociologists of the profes-
sions have long highlighted, there may be many ‘gaps’ between official values
and codes of conduct and those operationalised within day-to-day work
(Freidson, 1988 [1970]).
Much ethnographic literature on psychiatry appears to confirm such a dis-
parity between the ideas, approaches and understandings concerning psycho-
pathology set out in the DSM, and those conceptions held and enacted by
individual psychiatrists. As Light (1980) has shown, in practice, there are
several mechanisms through which psychopathology gets labelled and dealt
with in the clinic which are only partly structured by the DSM. Brown (1987),
building upon Light’s work, has made similar observations. While DSM diag-
nostic categories are ‘perhaps the chief language by which psychiatric and other
medical reality is constructed’ (ibid., p. 43), Brown has nevertheless shown
that psychiatrists ‘evade and criticize’ (ibid., p. 45) formal APA diagnostics.
Understandings of psychopathology and of patients thus intertwine the idiom of
psychiatric officialdom with conceptions of mental ill-health that are ‘cultural,
grounded in non-professional lay ideology’ (Gaines, 1979, p. 381).
These points have been underscored by more recent work. For instance,
Rafalovich (2005) has demonstrated the great extent to which broader
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professional and cultural concerns impact upon the diagnosis of ADHD and the
kinds of therapies that are prescribed; the construct was viewed by his clinician
participants as a psychopathological entity that the DSM only partly captured.
In the United Kingdom, McPherson and Armstrong (2006) have similarly
documented the diversity of ‘unofficial’ diagnostic terms employed by psy-
chiatrists when writing about depression (see also Whooley, 2010). Outwith
Anglophonic countries, Lester (2007) has shown how the DSM is less powerful
in Mexico than in the United States – even when the manual is employed on a
routine basis (cf. Lakoff, 2005).
Thus, though clearly integral to contemporary mental health, psychiatrists
nevertheless work with the DSM in a variety of ways, reconfiguring its categories
to fit with existing work practices and personal and professional attitudes and
approaches. Furthermore, clinical work is also strongly influenced by the national
and local cultures within which it is practised. This raises key questions regarding
how DSM categories travel to new contexts, and the extent and means by which
they become embedded in their new homes. At the same time, it reminds us that
evaluative analyses of psychiatry, which take the DSM as their focus may not
always fully capture the nuances of the clinical work they seek to critique.
The Medicalisation of Personality and Behaviour
Attending to the creation, use and reimagining of terminological standards
within psychiatry reminds us of the extent to which psychiatry is commonly
viewed as a salient agent of medicalization, including through diagnostic
endurance and innovation (Pilgrim, 2007; for example, around personality
disorders; Manning, 2000). Such innovativeness is powered through ‘engines of
diagnosis’ (Jutel, 2009, p. 291), not least of which are pharmaceutical industry
marketing campaigns.
A number of mental health professionals have themselves been ardent and
vocal critics of such medicalising processes, including ‘anti-psychiatrists’ like
David Cooper (1974 [1967]), Laing (1967 [1959]) and Thomas Szasz (1974).
Today, ‘critical psychiatrists’ in the United Kingdom also draw notice to what
they perceive as a predominant technocratic and naı¨vely realist epistemological
approach to diagnosis and therapy within their profession. Instead of this, they
emphasise the importance of listening to patients’ own narratives about their
subjective distress, and attending to the wider social and cultural context within
which these are set (see Bracken and Thomas, 2005).
In the social sciences, the concept of medicalisation has come to be highly
polyvalent, though its most critical formulation argues that everyday life
is evermore governed by regimes of medical power and control – to the
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disadvantage of society and its constituents (Zola 1972; Illich, 1976). Rather
than asserting that certain thoughts, feelings and behaviours should ‘merely’ be
dealt with more compassionately and thoughtfully by doctors, some medicali-
sation theorists challenge the idea that they should be framed within a ‘medical
model’ at all. Today, the concept is often associated with critiques of psychiatry
that emphasise social, rather than biological, origins and aspects of subjective
distress. This is linked to assertions that phenomenological instead of phar-
maceutical approaches to practice comprise more appropriate means through
which therapy can be managed (for example, Aho, 2008).
Explicitly, sociological research and theorising on medicalisation often takes
Conrad’s (2006 [1975]) seminal monograph on childhood hyperactivity as its
starting point. Framed by the work of sociologists of deviance such as Goffman
and Scheff, Conrad (2006, p. 5) considered his book a case study in ‘the
medicalization of deviant behaviour’.2 Before the late 1950s children were
active, disruptive and restless, but there was no medical framework available
for understanding them as ‘hyperactive’; in other words, hyperactivity simply
‘did not exist’ (Conrad, 2006, p. 6). Seeking to describe how this medical
conceptualisation developed and analyse how non-physicians likewise
(re)interpreted behaviour as a psychiatric problem, Conrad argued that close
links between diagnostic labels and drug treatments were important pre-
requisites for popular understandings of childhood (mis)behaviour as patho-
logical. More specifically, it was essential both that diagnostic labels captured a
spectrum of behaviours upon which pharmaceuticals could effect change (or
‘treat’), and that ‘moral entrepreneurs’ actively promoted the diagnostic label and
its treatment. The pharmaceutical industry was regarded as one such en-
trepreneur; as Healy (2004) has also shown, the influence of ‘Big Pharma’ on the
development of psychiatric knowledge has been pervasive.
The relationships between standards, psychiatric practice, and those
institutions which manufacture its therapeutic interventions continue to be a focus
for much contemporary work within the sociology of mental health (linking with
broader concerns about the pharmaceuticalisation of society; see Busfield, 2006;
Abraham, 2010; Williams et al, 2011). Recently, for instance, Scott (2006) has
extended Conrad’s work to examine the medicalisation of shyness, linking this to
the development and rising use of the DSM diagnostics social phobia, social
anxiety disorder and avoidant personality disorder. Echoing Conrad, she asserted
that these labels are, today, now ‘applied to an increasing number of people who
would once have been seen as “just shy” ’ (ibid., p. 135). Culpability for this was
ascribed to pharmaceutical company executives, genetic researchers, counsellors
and authors of self-help books through either contributing directly to the reifica-
tion of a specific psychiatric diagnosis, or indirectly, through the framing of
shyness as an individual problem in need of fixing.
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Analyses of medicalisation thus continue to exert a significant influence on
social scientific understandings of mental health (for example, Horwitz, 2002;
Horwitz and Wakefield, 2007), and critical research in this area – emphasising
as it does the social and political aspects of individual and societal ‘problems’ –
is persuasive. In demonstrating the complex inter-connections between psy-
chiatry, science and society, such work also opens up further avenues for
sociological exploration. In particular, it underscores the importance of
examining issues pertaining to the ontology of health and illness. Is there such a
thing as ‘shyness’ that exists independently of the discourse that describes it?
How do we know that it is normal? When do we decide that it is pathological?
These are questions that some philosophers of medicine have advanced intri-
guing answers to (Canguilhem, 1998 [1966]; Hacking, 2002), but which
sociologists might yet layer further empirical detail upon (Pickersgill, 2009).
At the same time, a note of caution when engaging with the concept of
medicalisation is perhaps itself warranted. In some quarters, there remain sig-
nificant concerns about the utility of this as a form of critique (for example,
Miller and Rose, 1988; Rose, 2007b). Indeed, Conrad himself is often regarded
as being somewhat neutral on the issue of whether medicalisation can be
straightforwardly understood as a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ thing. Perhaps, the most
notable critical engagement with the emerging literatures on medicalisation was
made in the 1970s, in what has become widely regarded as a classic article by
Phil Strong (1979). He argued that ‘many of the critiques of medical imperialism
lack any historical or anthropological awareness’ (Strong, 1979, p. 205).
Instead, it was sociology itself that was being imperialist when issuing forth
sweeping criticisms of medicine. Drawing on his research on alcoholism, Strong
suggested that expansionist tendencies within medicine were over-estimated,
reflecting the aims and wishes of high-profile campaigners rather than doctors
at the coalface of practice. In effect, medicine was too diverse an enterprise for
terms such as ‘medicalisation’ to be employed when discussing the profession
in general.
Strong’s perspective on psychiatry was evocative of other empirical sociolo-
gists of psychiatric practice. In particular, it resonated with the work of
Schatzman and Strauss (1966), who noted the broad differences between the
ways in which individual psychiatrists diagnosed, understood and managed
mental illness in the United States. As they put it: ‘To think in terms of a single
psychiatric community is to stretch one’s imagination beyond credulity’ (ibid.,
p. 6) – the profession was, and remains, highly heterogeneous (Pickersgill, 2010).
It is important to note that Strong was not seeking to disparage work in
medicalisation, nor was he suggesting such work was without warrant. In his
words, ‘Some developments in medicine are profoundly disturbing and worthy
of much further investigation, publicity and action’ (Strong, 1979, p. 201).
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Rather than denigrate analyses of medicalisation, Strong therefore sought
instead to nuance these debates and prioritise the formulation of sociological
positions concerning medicine that were grounded in empirical data. It is within
this vein that many sociologists have continued to explore the multiple and
complex ways that particular modes of life and bodily qualities come to fit
within the purview of medicine; the means by which this has shifted corre-
sponds with evolutions in modernity itself (Ballard and Elston, 2005).
It is likewise clear that even if everyday aspects of biological or social life are
successfully reframed and delineated into psychiatric categories, these may not
be translated into clinical practice and personal understandings of subjective
experience. As Knaapen and Weisz (2008) have shown for premenstrual dys-
phoric disorder (PMDD), the number of women seeking medical assistance in
managing their premenstrual ‘problems’ is relatively slight. As well as such
‘incomplete’ medicalisation, analysts have also shown how processes of situ-
ating somatic and psychic experience within a medical rubric might be initiated
through the work of ‘sick’ actors themselves. Individuals may go to great
lengths when striving to have their distress recognised as a legitimate medical
disorder (Dumit, 2006), including careful presentation of ‘symptoms’ within
medical consultations such that they fit into recognised criteria for disease
(Hyde´n and Sachs, 1998). To draw again on the example of premenstrual
‘conditions’, some individuals can feel empowered by the recognition of their
distress as a medical problem and actively seek to foster or even create the
discourse that will frame it as such (Figert, 1996).
The history of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) further provides us with
a striking example of such ‘auto-medicalisation’. The emergence of PTSD as an
object of psychiatric concern has been argued to be the result of the mutual
efforts of US veterans from the Vietnam War who believed themselves to be sick
and in need of treatment, and a relatively small group of psychiatrists who
agreed (Scott, 1990; Young, 1995).3 These efforts were deliberate, self-conscious
and strategic, though their success depended not just on the work of the
actors involved but on the political climate within the United States in general
and a particular professional approach within psychiatry specifically. The im-
portant role actors can play in their own medicalisation is nevertheless readily
apparent.
The processes of medicalisation also has a significant potential to animate
new kinds of sociality. This is not just within biomedicine and the social
sciences, but in society at large. In particular, we can see that a significant
corollary of the reframing of what were once widely perceived as everyday
problems of living into psychiatric concerns can be political outrage and action
on the part of those who come to be considered in some way ‘sick’. This is
exemplified by the history of the mental health service-user and survivor
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movements in the United Kingdom (Crossley, 2006). In the case of specific
‘disorders’, institutions like the American Psychological Association and other
critics have been vocal in their concerns regarding (for instance) the psychiatric
construal of premenstrual body changes as late luteal phase dysphoric disorder
and PMDD (Rodin, 1992; Richardson, 1995; Figert, 1996). Likewise, the mobi-
lisation of campaigners, including psychiatrists, against the APA for their
inclusion of homosexuality within the DSM is widely known. This is commonly
regarded as having led, in 1973, to the removal of this construct as a disorder
within the APA manual (Bayer, 1981). Processes of (de)medicalisation within
psychiatry therefore prove to be important both in provoking social action and
change.
Medicalisation thus does not take place along a singular, linear trajectory.
Rather, it might be better understood as a set of processes enabled by and
co-produced through the interactions between a heterogeneous assemblage of
standards, clinical practice, scientific research and patient activism. Debate
about how appropriate it is to consider a phenomena or entity as part of a
medical rubric thus necessarily entails asking questions about the relationships
between medicine, science and society. Any answers reached are, in part, a
consequence of the existing patterning of these domains; however, they may yet
effect a reconfiguration of this network. As such, it may be difficult to fully
empirically substantiate broad critiques of psychiatry targeted at its tendency to,
as an assumed homogeneous institution, adversely medicalise everyday life.
The Recourse to (Neuro)Biology in Psychiatry
If psychiatrists are sometimes critiqued as agents of medicalisation, they are
more specifically criticised for drawing on modes of thought and practice that
emphasise the somatic aspects of psychopathology. US psychiatrist and cultural
studies scholar Bradley Lewis has made clear these concerns:
Contemporary psychiatry tends to focus on neurochemical and genetic
explanations, to place technological solutions over ethical and human
consideration, and to use forced treatment methods to resolve clinical
controversy. (Lewis, 2006, p. x)
Such assertions draw attention to the cautiousness some commentators feel
regarding the place and role of (neuro)biology within psychiatry – a form of
knowledge production that is itself reliant on DSM categories in order to stan-
dardise experimental populations. More broadly, biomedical reductionism is
often taken to be concerning by social scientists. As Peter Bearman remarked
in the introduction to a special issue of the American Journal of Sociology on
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‘genetics and social structure’, the reaction of sociologists to genetic research
into human behaviour has been commonly characterised by ‘fear and loathing’
(Bearman, 2008, p. v). Troy Duster exemplified this hostility in a presidential
address before the American Sociological Association, speaking of the challenge
that ‘reductionist knowledge production’ (Duster, 2006, p. 1) posed to sociol-
ogy. Even if not framed explicitly using the language of ‘reductionism’, so-called
‘biological psychiatry’ is often perceived critically by social science commen-
tators (and also by many mental health professionals and individuals who have
used, or continue to use, psychiatric services).
Certainly, it is accurate to say that talk of (neuro)biology is prominent within
contemporary psychiatric discourse (Luhrmann, 2000; Rose, 2007a). Indeed,
even psychotherapies are increasingly being viewed through a neuroscientific
frame. As Martin (2007) and Nadesan (2005) have shown, neurologic for-
mulations of bipolar disorder and autism, respectively, are the default models
within US psychiatric research and practice. Likewise, many who live under the
label of these disorders (sometimes) conceptualise them as brain dysfunctions,
and articulate (ambivalent) expectations about the future potential of neuro-
science to ‘objectify otherwise subjective experience’ and contribute to the
development of new interventions (Buchman et al, forthcoming, p. 11).
Furthermore, it seems clear that the use of drugs to treat mental health issues
is increasing; ‘Whether it is brain scans or genetic tests’, sociologist Nikolas
Rose asserts, ‘all pathways through the brain seem to end in the use of psy-
chopharmaceuticals’ (Rose, 2007a, p. 209). Arguing that (in part) through the
neurologic narratives associated with such drugs, ‘we’ have now learnt to
understand ourselves as individuals whose ‘desires, moods and discontents’ (Rose,
2007a, p. 188) are mapped upon the brain, Rose has suggested that contemporary
subjects are, in significant ways, ‘neurochemical selves’. Such forms of sub-
jectification underscore wider processes of ‘pharmaceuticalisation’ that sociolo-
gists have come to observe and critique (Abraham, 2010; Williams et al, 2011).4
Yet, keeping in mind the heterogeneity of psychiatry, we may wish to examine
these claims more closely. Excitement about brain technologies and the new
knowledge they promise to deliver is certainly not exclusive to the twenty-first
century (Borck, 2008), nor is the critique that accompanies it. Rather, since the
nineteenth century psychopathology has been thought to have cerebral origins,
and, more generally, concerns over reductionism are so longstanding as to
make them ‘a cliche´’ (Rosenberg, 2007, p. 34). Furthermore, a somatic emphasis
within psychiatry is not only far from novel, but commonly intimately connected
with more psychological and even sociological styles of thought (Moncrieff
and Crawford, 2001; Rasmussen, 2006; Sadowsky, 2006; Pickersgill, 2010). Such
analyses stand in marked contrast to characterisations of mental health theory,
research and practice that suggest a recent and radical turn to biology.
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When thinking about the relationship between (and mutual constitution of)
neuroscience and mental health, we might also note the complex and dynamic
relations between the laboratory and clinic (Kraft, 2006; Wainwright et al, 2006;
Martin et al, 2008). In the 1990s, serious concerns were expressed over genetics
in response to the ambitious claims of scientists working in and journalists
reporting on this area (Lippman, 1992; Nelkin and Lindee, 1996). However,
while some sociologists found support for assertions of the dominance of
genetic aetiological narratives for certain disorders (Kerr, 2000), in other cases
genetic explanations were just one more thread in the ontological tapestry
woven together by professionals and publics (Nukaga and Cambrosio, 1997;
Bates et al, 2003; Weiner and Martin, 2008). In discourse on schizophrenia, for
instance, genetic factors are often placed in the foreground, but non-genetic
causative agents still have a role to play (Hedgecoe, 2001). Although con-
siderable research activity centred on genetics, profound effects of this on much
clinical discourse and practice were less evident.
We can therefore see that even if neurological models of psychopathologies
are postulated by scientists, their acceptance by clinicians and translation into
practice cannot be taken for granted. The relationship between neuroscience
research and mental health practice is ‘uncertain’ (Cullen and Cohn, 2006,
p. 117); for example, both neurologic models of ADHD and psychopharma-
ceutical means of managing it may be resisted by US psychiatrists (Rafalovich,
2005). Joyce (2012) more boldly summarises this issue: in spite of ‘significant
government investment’ in neuroimaging techniques aimed at clarifying the
opacity of psychopathology, ‘research has yet to produce diagnostic markers
reliable at the individual level for psychiatric illnesses nor have clinical psy-
chiatrists or psychologists been enrolled as prescribers of the techniques’.
Even when neurological models are invoked to explain psychiatric disorder,
they may be employed alongside an assortment of other perspectives, as psy-
chiatrists move between differing biological, psychological and social under-
standings of psychopathology as part of a ‘biopsychosocial’ model of theory and
practice (Barrett, 1996; Pickersgill, 2011). This is not surprising, given the broad
differences between the ways psychiatrists understand and treat mental illness
(Schatzman and Strauss, 1966), even while their work and discourse is
grounded within nationally (and, to a limited degree, internationally) shared
training, governance and regulation. Like other biomedical professionals
(Shostak, 2003), psychiatrists thus focus their gaze into the body, towards genes
and brains, as well as outward, to inter-personal relations and social structure.
Such ontological hybridity seems, to a degree, to be operative even within
neuroscience research itself (Pickersgill, 2009).
The literature on medicine and society also reminds us that patients are also
likely to engage in complex ways with neurobiological characterisations of the
Pickersgill
338 r 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1477-8211 Social Theory & Health Vol. 10, 4, 328–347
disorders for which they are diagnosed. For instance, in their study of tests for
determining the risk of developing late onset Alzheimer’s disease, Lock et al
(2006, p. 277) found that, following testing, new genetic knowledge ‘rarely
usurps other forms of understanding, but is nested by interviewees into pre-
viously held ideas about who in the family is most at risk for the disease’. Such
findings imply that patients, like mental health professionals, may fit conditions
into a range of overlapping interpretative frameworks. More generally, it seems
that a variety of individuals are resistant to reducing their subjective experience
to the alchemy of neurochemistry. Instead, people articulate subjectivity
through the idiom of neuroscience and the neurological only at certain times,
and in particular and ambivalent ways (Pickersgill et al, 2011).
For those individuals who do take fully on board the ‘lessons’ of neurobiol-
ogy, the ‘outcomes’ have not necessarily been the dehumanisation and
increased marginalisation that some commentators have feared. In the case of
schizophrenia, for instance, some patients have made vigorous attempts to
represent their subjective distress as dysfunctional neurology within the public
sphere in an attempt to decrease the stigma they face in their daily lives. In
particular, the US National Alliance of Mental Illness have explicitly adopted
what some might regard as a neurobiologically reductionist model of mental
illness (Dumit, 2004). Such neurological perspectives may also open up new
avenues for patients to engage with doctors about the best kinds of treatment
available to them, and make their own ‘autonomous, rational choices about
which drugs to take’ (Martin, 2007, p. 91). Far from objectifying patients and
compromising their care, neuroscience might create new ways through which
individuals can understand themselves and one another, and create novel
opportunities for biopolitical action (Rose, 2007a). Nevertheless, some research
suggests that public attitudes to psychiatric disorder have not increased in
tolerance, despite the rise of biological models in public discourse (Schnittker,
2008), and on-going practices of involuntary treatment add shadow to bright
pictures of independent agents who actively control their pharmaceutical con-
sumption.
In sum, while there is a significant biological emphasis in psychiatric thought,
research and practice, this should not be over-estimated. The interaction of
biological and other styles of thought has long been apparent within psychiatry:
neurologic conceptions of psychopathology are thus perhaps more likely to sit
side-by-side with other interpretative frameworks than they are to fully supplant
them. Even neuroscientists themselves can often be characterised as drawing
upon a broadly ‘biopsychosocial’ model of mental disorder to structure their
work (even if they emphasise the somatic ‘factors’ within this). However, if the
recourse to (neuro)biology within psychiatry at an institutional and discursive
level does carry through to the practices of individual practitioners, this does
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not necessarily and always mean that patients accept this formulation of their
experience or are disadvantaged by it. Rather, they may resist neurologic fig-
urations, or perhaps adapt them to fit with existing understandings of their
conditions. Biological framings of subjective distress might – in some cases –
even be found liberating and politically useful, and neuroscientific knowledge
might be drawn on by patients in order to engage in new, more autonomous
ways with health professionals. In essence, the existence of (neuro)biological
styles of thought does not determine in any uniform way the social practices
and subjective understandings with which it is (or has the potential to be)
associated.
Conclusion
In this essay, I have sought to underscore the multidimensionality of psychiatry.
Neither psychiatric institutions nor clinical knowledge itself is completely
reducible to either ‘social’ or ‘natural’ forces (McLean, 1990); rather, they are
material-semiotic hybrids that are – in the idiom of science and technologies
studies (Jasanoff, 2004) – co-produced. This is not, of course, unrecognised
within sociology. In 1966, for instance, Leonard Schatzman and Anselm Strauss
discussed the role of socio-cultural changes in shaping the kinds of psychiatric
institutions in existence. These in turn limited psychiatric theory, but at
the same time were changed by them. Drawing on Schatzman and Strauss’
empirical research, Lindsay Prior (1991, 1993) has likewise shown how psy-
chiatric ideology and the social organisation of therapy are mutually dependent.
Yet, critical discourse on psychiatry does, on occasion, inadvertently reduce this
complexity – and therefore the critique it seeks to level can sometimes miss its
mark (though I am not unaware that the same claim could of course be made of
this essay as well).
In response to this, I have instead tried to emphasise some of the complex
dynamism of the relationships between biomedicine, science and society that
co-produce psychiatry. However, in so doing our empirical object is rendered
unstable. This creates particular challenges for sociologists. Rather than
focusing upon a unified entity, our gaze is necessarily refracted through a
complex prism of diverse theories, researches and practices that are constituted
through scientific knowledge, professional orientations, patient activism, ter-
minological standards, legal strictures and societal demands. To speak of
‘psychiatry’ is in many ways problematic, if methodologically, pragmatically
and politically necessary.
If we do regard psychiatry as complex socio-technical praxis, then critiques
of the profession that do not account for this are unable to fully capture its
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nuances, nor the ethical and political implications of psychiatric theory,
research and practice. The emancipatory agenda of critical discourse is there-
fore undermined. It is for this reason that in this essay I have endeavoured to
map some of the contradictions and disjunctures in psychiatry, with the aims of
stimulating further research into their characteristics and animating further
debate regarding how they might be engaged with.
In so doing, I have indulged in my own kinds of ‘pragmatic reductionism’
(Beck and Niewo¨hner, 2006, p. 223) in order to tell this particular story. In
particular, much more remains to be said about the broader changes within the
heterogeneous network of public mental health care that psychiatry is part of,
such as the important Improving Access to Psychological Therapies initiative in
England and Wales (Pilgrim and Carey, 2012). Such programmes, and wider
changes to mental health law, are contributing to the telling of new narratives
about the psychiatric profession, its practices and its relationships with (and
distinctiveness in regards to) clinical psychology and nursing – including the
potential further ‘fracturing’ of psychiatry authority (Samson, 1995), and not
solely within the United Kingdom (Hopper, 2007). At the same time, new forms
of responsibilisation are occurring, which act to simultaneously expand and
contract the psychiatric purview: new programmes of early intervention, for
instance, extend the psychiatric gaze, while professional ethical reflexivity and
societal critique serve to raise questions around the prescription of psycho-
tropics (especially to children). The question of what psychiatry is remains
difficult to answer; however, debates about what it might, could or should be
continue to be necessary to rehearse and elaborate.
The need for a robust and empirically grounded critical sociology of psy-
chiatry is ever more necessary in light of the new DSM-5 currently in devel-
opment. There is good evidence to suggest that we can expect this manual
to have wide-ranging and international clinical and societal implications.
‘Psychiatry’ shapes, and is shaped by, science and society, as well as through
shifting intra-professional concerns; nevertheless, it is clear that in spite of (and
perhaps because of) these complex processes of co-production, the DSM plays
an important role in lending some kind of order to the incoherence of psy-
chiatric multiplicity. Only through fully recognising the multifaceted nature of
psychiatry might we grant ourselves an appropriate vantage point from which
to visualise its constitutive articulations – and, hence, intervene in them.
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Notes
1 That is, whether different psychiatrists are likely to give a patient the same diagnosis, not
whether the diagnosis is ‘accurate’ and captures a psychopathology that exists before attempts
made to diagnose it.
2 For other work in the historical sociology of psychiatry that, like Goffman, take a dim view on
institutionalisation, see Baruch and Treacher (1978); Castel (1988); Foucault (2001 [1961]) For
analyses that have tried to move beyond such critiques, see Miller and Rose (1986).
3 Of course, trauma itself also had to become an entity that could be considered
psychopathological; the history of this mutation extends further back than the Vietnam War
(Orr, 2006).
4 It is also important to note that, in the case of mental health, we may in fact be beginning to see
the formation of the conditions of possibility for de-pharmaceuticalisation, since drug
companies are moving away from attempts to develop new psychopharmaceuticals (Insel
et al, 2012).
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